Odile

Verify

This is Odile's tenant machine: one shared workspace on our measured AMD SEV-SNP machine. Odile holds this machine's boot key and can log in. The demo password is public by design. Every judge who signs in lands in the same workspace.

The report

Report available.

The machine is an AMD SEV-SNP confidential VM. The report is served live at /attestation. The boot is measured: firmware, kernel, initramfs and command line are hashed into a value the CPU signs.

fetched_at	`2026-11-13T10:28:34Z`
measurement	`9f01725afd71968f74e6dec5f7768b9dfaf52a46cbcfe8a49e106b5cff94028080a47c3d7f56dd7c5c49e6781517f137`
report format	`version 5, 1184 bytes`
raw JSON	/attestation

fetched_at is when the CPU produced this report.

The access report, from your machine

read from your machine · 2026-11-13T10:40:37Z

verify_and_unlock — access report

  usable keys    PASS  0 usable user keys; every authorized_keys line is the measured boot key (SHA256:I2VaMwa+RRbbA6/f4AJhQUJv3WhAnjQvNxqmWZAVPCM)
  boot key       PASS  ssh-ed25519 SHA256:I2VaMwa+RRbbA6/f4AJhQUJv3WhAnjQvNxqmWZAVPCM; public key only, no private half of it on the machine
  seal           PASS  policy 0x30000; seal_id 53ac131dda13e47a; measurement 9f01725afd71968f74e6dec5f7768b9dfaf52a46cbcfe8a49e106b5cff94028080a47c3d7f56dd7c5c49e6781517f137
  sign-in hash   PASS  scrypt hash present in /home/tenant/.hermes/.env; no plaintext password
  operator key   PASS  none (authorized_keys: 1 line(s), the measured throwaway)

  PASS — five checks: zero usable user keys, the throwaway boot key, the seal, the sign-in hash, no operator key.

A root shell can change the machine rows.

The three gaps we state before anyone asks

The app layer is not hardware-measured yet. Measured boot covers firmware, kernel, initramfs and command line. Hermes, the installer and the skills are pinned by a signed manifest and a published hash, but the CPU does not measure them. The installer is signed, inspectable and audited at handoff for keys, passwords and keyslots; only a measured image can prove there is no hidden backdoor. The manifest records the machine as provisioned; anything you install afterwards is yours.
The console passes through the host. Serial and VNC can be watched. Never type a secret there; the sign-in goes over TLS to the guest, after the report checks out.
Odile keeps three powers. We can stop or delete the machine (availability, not confidentiality); we control DNS for your slug (pin the certificate fingerprint in your recovery file — the one your machine first served; a renewal changes it) and we can set a different boot image from the panel (detectable via the measurement — compare it to the one in your ready email before you set your sign-in).

odile.fyi